Compulsory Return as a Labor-Migration Control in East-Asia

 they retained passport since arrival  unpaid salary 

Such an obsession about guaranteeing the return of unskilled labor migrants 

will be fined or banned from bringing more migrant workers in the future if their workers go missing or overstay

compulsory return brings the migratory journey to a definite end

Transnational encapsulation has two aspects, international rupture and transnational policing.

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Owing to the needs of the labor force, Japan, Korea and Singapore “import" these unskilled foreigner workers, while regulating them with strict isolation, surveillance and in the end,  compulsory return as an accomplishment will be done. Xiang suggests that these attempts of control, or the circumstance made by these attempts lead to transnational encapsulation, which consist of international rupture and transnational policing. Compulsory return as a main factor causing rupture, would deprive everything the migrants have or earned in host society. The end of the story of migrant workers is always compulsory return.

This regulation is in fact a mechanism maximizing host society’s profit and minimizing its burden. This kind of attempt of control is exactly the counter force impacting both host society and workers. For instance, in the beginning of this chapter, the mistrust between Japanese employers and Chinese workers can be easily observed by anyone. It is also contradictory and ironic that those veteran workers who overstayed in Japan and Korea have actually better skill and local habitus than newcomers. My opinion on this phenomena is that either Japan or Korea still regard itself as a single ethnic nation. In context, they don’t recognize there are immigrants in the country. For those hoping to stay, they end up becoming missing populations, unable to medicare and welfare, which are absolutely a human rights crisis. The regulation itself is hotbed breeding disconnecting workers.

According to this reading, it seems like these East-Asia countries consider letting unskilled labor migrants come alone, sending them back under overseeing a good method of controlling domestic migrant population. However, I argue that what behind this regulatory system is an ideology of production. What they actually crave for is labor resources, rather than migrants, so they import them; extract them. Once they are expired, the nation-states would send them home. This can be illustrated as a typical marxist alienation which has been developed into international degree. The linchpin of regulations is compulsory return. These well-developed countries don’t give migrants long duration of residence to prevent them from evolving their social network in host societies. It’s just long enough for them to devote their best years in life, but it’s not long enough for them to feel belongings and connection here.

questions and comments 

1.In Japan, it’s regulated by law that every foreigner has an obligation holding their resident card (zairyu card) anywhere and anytime. I think this is also a reminder to us that we don’t truely belong here. And thinking of my own experience in Japanese language school, some of my classmates are ordered to leave Japan in two or three weeks as long as they aren’t qualified (such as failed at graduate school entrance tests). So it seems that not only workers but also students abroad are regulated by Japanese law. Despite of this kind of harsh rupture, Japanese government are likely to revise the law, adding two new category of certification(tokutei ginou 1 for unskilled workers and tokutei ginou 2 for skilled workers), that correspond to certain industries where lacks of labors such as shipbuilder, buildings, and household. In addition, certification 2 even allows families to come with workers and will provide permanent residency after 5 years, while it would remain the same in the cases of certification 1. I think we can argue that in response to needs, Japan has adjusted their policy to make itself more attractive to migrants. It is a flexible strategy absorbing workers. And at least we start seeing little humanity in the system.   

2. As I read this chapter, I can say that Taiwan has exactly the same situation in Japan and Korea. Furthermore, Taiwan invented a term “escaped foreign worker” to refer to those migrant workers quitting jobs without permission, which doesn’t exist. According to Taiwan’s regulations, workers aren’t allowed to change jobs by their own wills; they are allowed to do it unless there is unfairness or employers’ mistakes. However, the reactions of authority are always too slow. What they are allowed to do had been decided before they came to Taiwan. They don’t share the same conditions and maximum wages provided by Taiwan’s labor law. Especially workers in the household section who are easily abused(sexually included) by employers. Lots of them chose to escape from former places, becoming “escaped foreign workers” also as criminals. Some of them found good Taiwanese people or Taiwanese factory owners providing them jobs. This indicated an absurd phenomenon that we Taiwanese tend to treat them as dispensable human resources or even criminal, rather than improve employer-employee relations, and this leads to an eternal problem of lacking workers in the household section.