Assignments for International history in week6^7

New Look defense policy reducing expenditure and manpower 

Neither Eisenhower nor Dulles paid much attention to these attacks on the ‘New Look’, believing that the fear of an American nuclear response would discourage the communists from initiating adventures such as the Korean War          ‘the military-industrial complex[77]

1956 resulted in the unification of the country, when the French would withdraw. The United States and South Vietnam refused to recognise this agreement.[78]

improvement in East–West relations. However, Khrushchev’s willingness to talk to the West contributed to the growing divergence between the Soviet Union and communist China[81]

While Dulles recognised the dangers implicit in Khrushchev’s efforts to ally Soviet Communism with the forces of Third World nationalism, he was unable to devise a satisfactory policy to counter the threat[82]

Questions: 

1) Discuss the “Eisenhower revisionism” implied in the authors’ description of the Eisenhower presidency. 

Compared with Dulles, his Secretary of States, who was a firm anti-communist intending to send the US force to ease local events, Eisenhower insisted to reducing military expenditure and manpower, refusing to intervene into Vietnam and Egypt, and not following. Furthermore, I think it was very important that Eisenhower didn't follow the McCarthyism. The Cold War could have been escalated if the president took advantage of a nationwide anti-communism hatred. I am not suggesting that Eisenhower was friendly to the Soviet but he was more practical at least. I think that the history would say Eisenhower's judgements were right. The relation with the Soviet was relatively easy and the US hadn't been involved in another Korean War during his presidency.

2) What was the context of Eisenhower’s warning against the “military industrial complex” in his Farewell Address in January 1961?

Eisenhower thought that if the expenditure remains high to maintain a powerful conventional army in order to prevent the Soviet's potential treat, it could lead to a group of huge corporations which would be too huge that can influence the government policy decisions in the future. 

Comment

I think the reading this week showed us a different scale to realize that age. It can be known as a Western-polar faction and the others instead of the pattern describing the West against the Communist. Taking Egypt as an instance, the Egyptians had cooperated with the West before America's rejection of selling arms. I can understand they were trying to control the tension between Israel and Arabic world, however, we can't infer that Egypt was an enemy before Suez Canal incident. Guatemala and Iran are also cases that the administrations being overthrown owing to disobey the US. But if according to this chapter, there were no evidence showing that they are pro-Soviet. It's the US who export or lead to revolution on these cases. My conclusion is, the West didn't distinguish the anti-West(particularly local nationalism) and the communism, or maybe these two meant same to them.

I think the relation between the West and the Soviet was relatively calm. But I argue that it was not just because that Eisenhower who was flexible and pragmatic was in the White house, but also Khrushchev who was also as steady as Eisenhower in the Kremlin.

My question

How can Eisenhower administration and Dulles make the judgement that, Egypt had leaned to Soviet Bloc? They refused Egypt's acquirement to sell advance weapons at the first place. Isn't that a prove that any country can be regarded as a possible opponent or Soviet's friend as long as they don't obey the US regional policy? Because as my opinion, Egypt were just trying to strengthen their ability to counter Israel. What the West did was pushing Egypt to the Soviet. You can't punish it for searching another seller.  

Questions:

1) What factors contributed the escalation of tension to the brink of inadvertent nuclear war over Cuba?

By arming Cuba with missiles, the Soviet Union can defer the US from invading Cuba, which Kennedy had tried, or launching missiles to mainland Soviet through Turkey. And also, a capability to threat the US directly may leave a strong leverage to negotiate with the US in the future. And I think that Khrushchev seemed to need a victory or demonstration after the failure in Berlin.

In the system level, this approach could be considered an approach restoring Soviet's reputation among communist countries. 

2) What made the peaceful resolution of the crisis possible?

It may be those several private channel between the White house and the Kremlin. And the existence of the UN, which is accepted by both side to oversee the entire dismantling process.

My question

Since the US had deployed missiles in Turkey many years ago, how come the Soviet didn't react until the Cuba crisis? In addition, it was said that the request to the US to remove missiles in Turkey was improvised. Is it fair to say that the Soviet was under threat more than the US during the entire Cold War? 

My comment

I argue that Khrushchev didn't ship missiles to Cuba irrationally, instead his strategic objective was multiple and quite logical. However, he misjudged American's reaction. According to this article, I argue that the Soviet's intentions providing missiles are to intensify Cuban's defense against possible invasions for the US, and to make Cuba become a satellite state which can strike the US immediately just like what America did in Turkey. Khrushchev did miscalculate American's response which they considered it a pre-war preparation. It would be not strange that Soviet wanted to arms its Caribbean ally up, but it was geographically impossible.